Some Remarks on Reservations to Declarations of Acceptance by Lamm, Vanda
 1216-2574 / USD 20.00 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
© 2006 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 47, No. 2, pp. 119–132 (2006) 
 DOI: 10.1556/AJur.47.2006.2.2 
 
 
 
VANDA LAMM∗ 
 
Some Remarks on Reservations to Declarations 
of Acceptance 
 
 
Abstract. The essay concerns the reservations attached to the declarations accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the two International Courts. 
 As early as during the 1920s when States consented to the compulsory jurisdicition of 
the first World Court they attached limitations on, conditions or reservations to their 
declarations of acceptance. For these declarations, there were no rules whatever prescribing 
any sort of uniformity or similarity of content in any aspects, and States formulated more 
and more complicated restrictions to their declarations of acceptance. 
 After the International Court of Justice had been established, States continued the practice of 
attaching reservations to declarations of acceptance and, moreover, increased the number thereof, 
“inventing” more and more complicated reservations. Quite a few of such reservations placed 
much more limitations on the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction than the interwar declarations of 
acceptance had done and a no small part of them left loopholes of escape from the jurisdiction 
recognized. 
 In analysing the problems of permissible reservations, the author refers to the rules and 
criterias developed in international treaty law on the reservations to multilateral treaties and to the 
jurisprudence of the two Word Courts. She concludes that the declarations of acceptance are 
unilateral acts and the States are free to attach any reservation to their declarations of acceptance.  
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In the law of treaties it is generally accepted that when signing, ratifying, 
approving or acceding to multilateral treaties States, in a formal declaration, 
may limit the effects of a treaty on themselves in relation to the other contracting 
parties as a condition for becoming a party to the particular treaty.1 On the 
analogy of this there has emerged a State practice to include limitations, 
conditions in their declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice. 
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 1 Cf. Lord McNair: The Law of Treaties. Oxford, 1961. 158. 
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 Already the very first declarations of acceptance made after the entry into 
force of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, contained 
some stipulations by which States limited their consent given to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court.  
 Both the literature of international law and the practice of the two Courts 
refer to such limitations, conditions, exclusions, exceptions or restrictions etc. as 
“reservations”, a term not the most fortunate chiefly because the said clauses are 
not deemed to be real reservations and, as will be discussed later, differ in many 
aspects from reservations to multilateral treaties.2 The appearance of such 
clauses was somewhat “unexpected”, for at the time of drafting the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice the Committee of Jurists did not 
anticipate any reservation being made concerning the compulsory jurisdiction 
accepted.3 On the other hand, the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction with 
reservations was not really so “unexpected”, since in interstate practice it is by 
no means a novelty that States made subject their consent to arbitration treaties 
to stipulations removing one or more specific issues from settlement by 
arbitration. Thus arbitration treaties frequently included stipulations to the effect 
that arbitration did not operate to issues affecting the “vital interests”, the 
“national honour”, the “independence” and such like of the given State. At the 
time this was taken for granted so much as to lead some authors to assert that 
“even when not definitely expressed, the stipulation concerning vital interests 
is yet included in all arbitration treaties.”4 
 
 
1. The Interwar Practice 
 
In connection with declarations under the optional clause Article 36, of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice provides the following: 
 
  
 2 Cf. Maus, B.: Les réserves dans les déclarations d’acceptation obligatoire de la 
Cour international de Justice. Genève, 1959. 94. 
 3 Cf. Oda, S.: Reservations in the Declarations of Acceptance of the Optional Clause 
and the Period of Validity of those Declarations: the Effect of the Schultz Letter. The 
British Yearbook of International Law 1989. 4. 
 4 Cf. Wehberg, H.: Restrictive Clauses in International Arbitration Treaties. American 
Journal of International Law. 1913. 310. 
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“The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on 
condition of reciprocity on the part of several Members or States or for a 
certain time” 
 
In other words, certain limitations, namely reciprocity and certain limitations 
as to time, are permitted by the Statute itself. Hersch Lauterpacht explains this 
as follows: 
 
“It is true that the Optional Clause does not provide expressis verbis for the 
possibility of reservations being made, but there is no necessity for any such 
express provision. As a general rule a State may qualify any treaty obligation 
by such reservations as it deems necessary; treaties of arbitration, as their 
history shows, certainly do not constitute an exception in this respect.”5 
 
In the early 1930s Alexander Pandelli Fachiri, writes that “... in the present 
state of international law the language of Article 36, with its reference to certain 
reservations, does not preclude the admissibility of further reservations one 
way or the other.”6 
 The literature of international law of the interwar period nevertheless contains 
views that–since Article 36, of the Statute refers only to “reciprocity” and “a 
certain time”–a contrario one can come to the conclusion that no other reser-
vations may be attached to declarations accepting the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction.7 That position found few followers, and, so far as we know, Judge 
Levi Carneiro was the only member of the two International Courts to identify 
himself with it.8 As against this, the dominant view was that Article 36, had no 
restrictive character in this respect and that States were free to attach other 
limitations on or reservations to their declarations of acceptance.9 An other 
  
 5 Lauterpacht, H.: The British reservation to the Optional Clause. Economica. 1930. 
168. 
 6 Cf. Cf. Fachiri, A. P.: The Permanent Court of International Justice. London, [1932] 
1980. 98. 
 7 Cf. Higgins, P. A.: British acceptance of compulsory arbitration under the Optional 
Clause and its implications. Cambridge, 1929. and Brierly: The Times (1929) [1 October]. 
Quot. Maus: op. cit. 85.  
 8 See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Levi Carneiro in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 
Case. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case. Preliminary Objections. Judgement 2 July 1952. ICJ 
Reports, 1952. 154. 
 9 Cf. Fachiri: op. cit. 98., and Lauterpacht: op. cit. 137., as well as Hudson, M. O.: The 
Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920–1942. New York, 1972. 399. 
122 VANDA LAMM 
  
 
author points out referring to the first Hague Peace Conference that “in the 
effort to reconcile the idea of obligatory arbitration with the possession of 
inalienable sovereign rights, it was natural that the idea of implied reserves 
should be urged ... if a state negotiating an arbitration convention should fail to 
include therein the ‘saiving clause’ to protect its national honour and vital 
interests, the clause would still be considered by implication.”10 Apart from the 
permissibility of reservations, an author argued that if a State is free to accept 
or not to accept the obligations set forth in the clause, then, in the absence of 
contrary provisions, the freedom not to accept the optional clause includes the 
freedom to make acceptance subject to conditions.11 
 The disputes about the permissibility of limitations on or reservations to 
declarations under the optional clause were rather academic in nature from the 
very outset, for in practice States availed themselves of the possibility to make 
reservations. In the declarations of acceptance there appeared multifarious 
reservations of varying scope and contents besides those mentioned in Article 
36, of the Statute.  
 The permissibility of reservations was likewise addressed by the League of 
Nations, its Fifth Assembly entrusting the 1st Committee with studying ways 
and means to clarify and refine the provisions of Article. 36, of the Statute of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in order to facilitate the widest 
possible acceptance of the clause.12 The question was finally discussed in a 
subcommittee,13 on the proposal of which and of the 1st Committee the Assembly 
of the League of Nations in its resolution of October 1924 expressed the view 
that the terms of the optional clause were broad enough for States to adhere 
to the clause “with the reservations which they regard as indispensable.”14 
 The 1st Committee of the League of Nations Assembly concurrently con-
cerned itself with the elaboration of a draft protocol on the peaceful settlement 
of international disputes. According to Article. 3, of the draft prepared by the 
Committee, the signatory States recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of 
  
 10 Cf. Wilson, R. R.: Reservation clauses in agreements for obligatory arbitration. 
American Journal of International Law, 1929. 70–71.  
 11 Cf. Williams, J. F.: The Optional Clause, The British Signature and Reservation. The 
British Yearbook of International Law, 1930. 637. 
 12 For the resolution see League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement No. 23. 
Records of the Fifth Assembly (Geneva 1924), 77. 
 13 The members of the Subcommittee were Adatci, Apponyi, Loucheur, Erich, Fernandes, 
Sir Cecil Hurst, O’Bryne, Politis, Rolin, Scialoja, Titulesco, De la Torriente, Limburg, 
Unden. Cf. Maus: op. cit. note 35. 17. 
 14 League of Nations Official Journal (Note 12), 225. 
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the Court in respect to the issues mentioned in Article 36, of the Statute, 
without, however, the Court’s jurisdiction affecting the right of any State to 
make reservations consistent with the said clause.15 
 The limitations on reservations were also addressed by the aforementioned 
Committee. But who is to decide which reservations are consistent with the 
said clause? Scialoja pointed out on this score that the Court was always 
competent in the question of its own jurisdiction and that the problem of 
whether a reservation was consistent with the Statute was one of competence, 
which was therefore solved in that way.16 An another view, expressed by 
Loucheur concerning the scope of reservations, a State may accede to the Statute 
including practically “all reservations” in its declaration.17 That position calls 
for explanation today. More accurately, one should say that a State might as 
well include in its declaration all reservations that happened to be made at the 
time. Under present-day conditions, however, such a declaration can only be 
made in theory, considering the wide range of reservations. 
 In its report on reservations to declarations of acceptance the 1st Committee 
of the League of Nations Assembly stated that on the basis a thorough 
examination of the text it can be stated that its flexibility leaves room for any 
kind of reservations. Since State may recognize the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction in some classes of disputes and may not in others, they are all the 
more free to recognize compulsory jurisdiction in only a fraction of one of 
those classes. For that matter, in its report the Committee enumerated the 
conceivable reservations, adding that the reservations attached to the obligations 
mentioned in Article 36, can be of quite a wide scope.18 
 During the preparations for the Disarmament Conference held in 1932 
under the auspices of the League of Nations the question of reservations to 
declarations of acceptance was again on on the agenda, since comparatively 
few States had made a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and a part of the declarations had not 
come into force. The Subcommittee on Arbitration and Security of the 
Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference discussed this question, 
and Assembly’s resolution of 26 September 1928 on the General Act for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, dealing also with the optional 
  
 15 Ibid. 498–499. 
 16 Ibid. No. 24. Annexe 18.37. Quot. Maus: op. cit. 17. 
 17 Ibid. 38. Quot. Maus: op. cit. 18. 
 18 For the reservations see Societé des Nations Journal Officiel, Procès verbal de la 1ère 
Commission, 109–110. 
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clause, was adopted as a result of deliberations in the Committee and the 3rd 
Committee of the League of Nations Assembly. In its resolution the Assembly 
stressed its wish to remove the obstacles to the accession of States to the optional 
clause and called their attention to the possibility of making reservations 
limiting their obligations in respect either of time or of scope. It was likewise 
mentioned in the resolution “...that reservations conceivable may relate, either 
generally to certain aspects of any kind of dispute, or specifically to certain 
classes or lists of disputes, and that these different kind of reservation can be 
legitimately combined.”19 
 Some authors considered that resolution of the League of Nations as an 
interpretation of the Statute, while others definitely rejected that view.20 
Whichever way we look at the resolution, it was unquestionably a political 
declaration without any binding force. At any rate, declarations accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice were 
made by several States after the adoption of the resolution. At the same time, 
however, the cited position of the League of Nations on reservations to decla-
rations of acceptance had certain “negative” effects as well, for afterwards States 
came making more and more complicated declarations and multiplying the 
limitations on the jurisdiction recognized.  
 According to Hudson, the tendency for declarations to become more 
complicated was but encouraged by Article 39, of the General Act of Geneva, 
which enoumerated three classes of disputes which might be excluded from the 
operation of a treaty by reservation.21 
 The position of the League of Nations on reservations to declarations of 
acceptance is well reflected by the words of Politis at a meeting of the 
Committee on Arbitration and Security of the Preparatory Commission for the 
Disarmament Conference. He stated: a State should choose to accede, rather 
than not to accede, to Article 36, of the Statute with reservations sharply 
  
 19 For the resolution see League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement No. 
64. Record of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly Plenary Meetings, 183. 
 20 Maus argues that the interpretation of the Statute of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice by the Assembly of the League of Nations has no legal force, because the 
Assembly was not empowered to modify and to interpret the Statute. The Statute was a 
separate treaty independent of the Covenant and subject to separate ratification, and the 
Member States of the League were not required to accede to the Statute. In point of fact, 
the Statute was either for the Court itself or for the Conference of States signatory to the 
Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice to 
interpret. Cf. Maus: op. cit. 19. 
 21 Hudson: op. cit. 468. 
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restricting its obligations. Acceptance with reservations, no matter of how little 
import, constitutes a new obligation among the States concerned and is to be 
regarded as a sign of confidence in the Court.22 
 The efforts of the League of Nations for the widest possible acceptance of 
the optional clause continued to be a concern of many authors even many 
decades later. At the end of the 1990s Judge Kooijmans observed “... that the 
League of Nations, in its efforts to encourage acceptance of the Court’s juris-
diction, endorsed the making of reservations to such acceptance (although Article 
36, paragraph 3, of the Statute does not formally authorize a declarant State 
to make such reservations), but by so doing weakened the system it tried to 
strengthen.”23 
 
 
2. The Post-World War Two Reservations 
 
With regard to the question of reservations to declarations under the optional 
clause the San Francisco Conference identified itself fully with the practice of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, although ideas pressing for change 
were also voiced. 
 During the deliberations in Subcommittee D of Committee IV/1 of the 
Conference Canada proposed that Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute should 
enumerate the conceivable reservations and include a clause allowing States to 
make futher reservations, whereas Australia came forward with the proposal 
that there should be drawn up a list of permissible reservations similar to that of 
the 1928 General Act of Geneva. The Subcommittee rejected both proposals, 
however.24 
 In connection with reservations to declarations of acceptance the report of 
Subcommittee D to Committee IV/1 of the Conference noted the following: 
 
  
 22 League of Nations Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament 
Conference, Series IV, Minutes of the Second Session of the Committee on Arbitration and 
Security (Geneva: 1928), 57. 
 23 See the separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans: Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. Jurisdiction 
of the Court. Judgement of 4 December 1998. Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans. ICJ 
Reports (1998), 489. 
 24 Report of Subcommittee D to Committee IV/1 on Art. 36 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice. In: UNCIO Documents, vol. XIII, 558. 
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“The question of reservations calls for an explanation. As is well known, 
the article (Article 36, of the Statute) has consistently been interpreted in 
the past as allowing states accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to subject 
their declarations to reservations. The Subcommittee has considered such 
interpretation as being henceforth established. It has therefore been considered 
unnecessary to modify paragraph 3, in order to make express reference to 
the right of the states to make such reservations.”25 
        
After the International Court of Justice had been established, States continued the 
practice of attaching conditions, limitations on or reservations to declarations of 
acceptance and, moreover, increased the number thereof, “inventing” more and 
more complicated reservations. Quite a few of such reservations placed much 
more limitations on the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction than the interwar 
declarations of acceptance had done and a no small part of them left loopholes 
of escape from the jurisdiction recognized. 
 Incidentally, among the post-1945 declarations of acceptance there is hardly 
any by which, like the interwar declarations of acceptance by the Latin American 
States, a State accepted the Court’s jurisdiction without limitations or reser-
vations.  
 In connection with the various reservations the question may rightly be 
asked as to what all this can be traced to and what is the reason for the growing 
number of increasingly complex reservations. In our view there are funda-
mentally three grounds for this phenomenon. 
 First, as it is very wittily pointed out in the report to the 1964 Tokyo Congress 
of the International Law Association, practically “(A)lmost every State has 
some skeletons in its closets and might not wish to have them exposed before 
the Court.”26 The report goes on to say, that “Even if States could avoid some 
difficulties through reservations, they are usually afraid that they might have 
forgotten something important or that some new problems might arise which 
could not have been covered by specific reservations. It is this fear of unforseen 
consequences which has led some States in the past to a refusal to accept the 
jurisdiction of the Court or to its acceptance with sweeping, open-ended 
reservations.”27  
 The second reason is related to the development of international law. As a 
consequence of the development of science and technology new subjects are 
  
 25 Ibid. 559.  
 26 International Law Association Report of the Fifty-First Conference, Tokyo, 1964. 87. 
 27 Ibid. 
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emerging to be regulated by international law, issues which are also naturally 
likely to give rise to new and new international disputes, as is exemplified by 
the regime for the continental shelf. After it had become know that the continental 
shelves are rich in oil and gas resources, regulation by international law of these 
areas became inevitable, and a large part of the disputes submitted to the 
International Court of Justice are connected with the jurisdiction on and the 
delimitation of continental shelfs. 
 The third reason can be ascribed to the fact that States have learnt from the 
jurisprudence of the Court, in the sense that, relying on the tenets formulated 
in the decisions of the Court, they have “shaping” new reservations in order 
to prevent the occurrence of similar cases. This is best demonstrated by the 
reservations which sought to avoid “surprise applications” and have become very 
common after the Court’s decision on the preliminary objections in the Case 
concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory. 
 For that matter, the problem of reservations to optional clause declarations 
has been repeatedly addressed by the United Nations as well. Perhaps the most 
important is resolution 3232 (XXIX) on the “International Court of Justice”, 
which was adopted by consensus on the motion of the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly. In it the General Assembly recognized the desirability for 
States to study the ways and means of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice with the least possible reservations in 
accordance with Article 36, of the Statute.28 That appeal and similar ones were 
scarcely heeded, with so many and so diverse reservations placed on some 
declarations that, with some exaggeration, they came to give cause for asking 
which are really the disputes in which the Court has jurisdiction in respect to a 
particular State under Article 36, paragraph. 2, of the Statute. In the Case of 
Certain Norwegian Loans Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in his separate opinon was 
refering that situation by saying:  
 
„In accepting the jurisdiction of the Court Governments are free to limit its 
jurisdiction in a drastic manner. As a result there may be little left in the 
Acceptance which is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court”.29  
 
  
 28 On this point see also the debate in the Sixth Committee. General Assembly 29th 
Session Sixth Committee, meetings 1465–1468; 1483–1486; 1490; 1492. Plenary meeting 
2280. 
 29 Case of Certain Norwegian Loans. Judgement of 6 July, 1957. Separate Opinion of 
Judge Sir Lauterpacht, H. ICJ Reports, 1957. 46. 
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The freedom to make reservations is recognized by most authors in the literature 
of international law, but occasionally one can meet with views that according 
to the new Statute no conditions, reservations to or limitations, etc. on decla-
rations of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction other than those relating to “on 
condition of reciprocity” and “for a certain time”, namely the ones mentioned in 
the Statute itself, are permissible.30 One author holds that there is one more 
permissible reservation in addition to the limitations mentioned in the Statute, 
notably States may, in line with Article 95 of the Charter, exclude from the 
operation of their optional clause declarations those disputes whose settlement 
they have previously entrusted to another tribunal.31 These positions are based 
on the fact that the wording of the optional clause in the new Statute have been 
slightly amended by omitting from Article 36, paragraph 2, the worlds “or any 
of the classes” in the passage of “in all or any of the classes of legal disputes.” It 
seems, however, that in point of fact the said authors misunderstand Article. 36 
paragraph 2, of the Statute, since the amendment of this Article is meant to say 
that States are no more free in their declarations of acceptance to pick and 
choose amongst the four enumerated classes of legal disputes listed in Article 
36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. However, the said amendment did not alter 
the freedom to make reservations to the declarations of acceptance in the same 
way as it existed at the time of the Permanent Court of International Justice.32 
 The view about the non permissibility of reservations not mentioned in the 
Statute was revived a few years ago in the Case concerning the Aerial Incident 
of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India). Because of the dispute relating to the 
destruction of Pakistani aircraft, Pakistan filed an application against India on the 
basis of Artilce 36, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Statute and of the declarations 
of acceptance by the two States. India responded by submitting preliminary 
objections, in which it invoked, inter alia, the Commonwealth reservation of its 
declaration of acceptance. Pakistan argued that no reservations other than those 
mentioned in the Statute may be attached to declarations under the optional 
clause. Limitations not included in the Statute–deemed to be “extra-statutory 
reservations”–exceed the conditions allowed for under Article 36, paragraph 3, 
  
 30 Vulcan, C.: La clause facultative. XVIII Acta Scandinavica Juris Gentium, 1947–
1948. 1, 42. 
 31 Thévenaz, H.: La nouvelle Cour international de Justice. Die Friedens-Warte, 1945, 
411. 
 32 Cf. Waldock, C. H. M.: Decline of the Optional Clause. The British Yearbook of 
International Law, 1955–56. 249. 
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of the Statute. According to Pakistan the Commonwealth reservation is 
inapplicable and not opposable to Pakistan.33 
 With regard to extra-statutory reservations the Court stated that paragraph 3 
of Article 36, had never been considered as an exhaustive enumeration of 
conditions under which States’ optional clause declarations might be made. For 
this reason the Court dismissed the Pakistani argument that Commonwealth 
reservations were to be seen as “extra-statutory reservation” because it contra-
vened Article 36, paragraph 3, of the Statute.34 
 On the basis of the foregoing it can be stated that the views limting the reser-
vations to declarations may be regarded as isolated, the dominant position 
being that according to the generally accepted interpretation of the Statute it 
is an inalienable right of States to attach different reservations, limitations on 
or conditions to their declarations under the optional clause. As regards the 
relationship between the various reservations and the provisions of the Statute, 
Crawford comes to the conclusions that since Article 36, paragraph 3, suggest 
that no other conditions were intended, “(T)he process by which reservations 
came to be accepted is a striking case of interpretative development of Article 
36 by subsequent practice...”.35 
 The permissibility of reservations attached to the declarations of acceptance 
and the liberty to shape their contents are similarly confirmed by the rarity of 
objections by States against other States’ declaration of acceptance or limitations 
contained therein. Such was the case, for instance, in the mid 1950s, when 
Sweden objected against the reservation of the Portuguese declaration of 19 
December 1955 to the effect that Portugal may at any time remove any class of 
dispute from the operation of its declaration of acceptance.36 That objection was 
of little effect, as is best evidenced by the fact that in the Right of Passage case 
the Court did not even pronounce on the Swedish objection  to the reservation of 
  
 33 Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 10th August 1999. Pleadings, Memorial of 
the Government of Pakistan on Jurisdiction, paras. D–E. 
 34 Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 10th August 1999. Jurisdiction of the Court. 
Judgement of 21 June 2000. ICJ Reports, 2000. paras. 37, 38. 
 35 Crawford, J.: The Legal Effect of Automatic Reservations to the Jurisdiction of the 
International Court. The British Yearbook of International Law, 1979. 79. 
 36 For the Swedish declaration see ICJ Pleadings Right of Passage over Indian Territory, 
Vol. I. 217. Sweden declared that, in view of the conditions included in the Portuguese 
declaration, Portugal had not in fact accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in respect to any 
dispute or to any class of disputes. That condition nullifies the obligation which the terms 
of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute seek to impose, expressing that the jurisdiction of 
the Court is ’ipso facto’ compulsory. 
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the Portuguese declaration of acceptance, albeit it had examined the validity of 
the Portuguese declaration. 
 An objection by another declarant State to the reservation included in an 
other State’s declaration of acceptance is to be found only in concrete disputes 
before the Court in which attempts are made to challenge in the form of 
preliminary objection the reservations invoked by the opponent party. 
 
 
3. The Special Feature of Reservations to Declarations of Acceptance 
 
The freedom to accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction with limitations or 
reservations has been recognized not only by the literature of international, but 
also by the two International Courts. In disputes which involved reservations to 
declarations of acceptance the majority of judges accepted the particular 
condition or reservation and did not consider the question of permissibility; 
they had never denied the permissibility of reservations to declarations of 
acceptance, only analysing the compatibility of a given reservation with the 
Statute and the optional clause system. 
 As regards the permissibility of reservations, the position of the International 
Court of Justice is reflected most clearly in its statement made in the Case 
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua: 
 
“Declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are 
facultative, unilateral engagements, that States are absolutely free to make 
or not to make. In making the declaration a State is equally free either to do 
so unconditionally and without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify it 
with conditions or reservations.”37 
 
The conditions or reservations to be found in declarations under the optional 
cluse differ from reservations made to multilateral treaties chiefly in that in the 
case of declarations of acceptance there is no text of a treaty agreed upon by 
the contracting parties, one which the State making the reservation wishes to 
depart from, to which it would be necessary to obtain the consent of the other 
parties to the treaty. So what we have here is not exclusion or modification 
the operation of certain provisions of the treaty, originally formulated jointly 
  
 37 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. 
Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application Judgement of 26 November 
1984. ICJ Reports, 1984. 418. 
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with the other contracting parties.38 As is shown by the practice of over eight 
decades, in making declarations under the optional clause States act in full 
freedom, deciding alone the scope of their declarations as well as the conditions 
on which they accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. In connection with 
declarations of acceptance there has arisen no rule to require any uniform text 
or similar content in any aspect. This was reaffirmed by the Court in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case to the effect that “Conditions or reservations thus do not by 
their terms derogate from a wider acceptance already given. Rather, they operate 
to define the parameters of the State’s acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court.”39 
 Another characteristic of limitations on, conditions or reservations to 
declarations of acceptance is that a limitation, condition or reservation–owing 
to the principle of reciprocity, which can be deemed to be a basic element of 
the optional clause system–operates to modify the commitments not only of 
the declarant State, but also of the other States party to the optional clause 
system, in any case where the Court’s jurisdiction was based on optional clause 
declarations. In a given case the limitations, conditions or reservations included 
in the declaration of a party, following from the principle of reciprocity, the 
opponent party may equally be rely upon these limitations, conditions or 
reservations. All this carries in itself the element of uncertainty that a State 
party to the optional clause system cannot know in advance whether in a future 
dispute a limitation, condition or reservation included in the declaration of 
other State parties to the optional clause system may be of advantage or of 
disadvantage to it.  
 Thus the limitations, conditions or reservations offer a possibility to exclude 
some unforeseen–or perhaps very likely–disputes, a possibility what could be 
an eventual advantage or disadvantage both to the State formulating the 
limitation, condition or reservation and to the State or States having opposite 
  
 38 In this context we have in mind acquiescence in reservations and eventual objections 
to reservations. At first sight (mainly if one is not fully aware of the characteristics of the 
optional clause) one might even raise the question whether Article 36, paras. 2 and 3, of the 
Statute, i.e. the optional clause, cannot be seen as a kind of „basic text” which States may 
exclude, modify, etc. by reservations to declarations of acceptance. Such an approach is 
mistaken by all means. Art. 36, paras. 2 and 3, of the Statute as the treaty provision which 
was adopted by the contracting parties and from which a State may depart by a reservation 
could be taken into consideration if the Statute prescribed the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court which States were allowed to „contracting out”. 
 39 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. Jurisdiction of the Court. Judgment 4 December 1998. 
ICJ Report, 1998. 453. 
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interests in a later case, depending on the subject matter of concrete disputes. It 
appears that we may not be far from the truth in supposing that what might 
also be lurking behind the rather seldom objections by States party to the 
optional clause system to limitations, conditions or reservations is perhaps the 
belief also of other States party to the system that in the future it could be an 
advantage to themselves to exclude certain disputes from the scope of 
compulsory jurisdiction. It is of course rather difficult to provide an instance of 
all this, but it is easy to suppose that reservations excluding disputes concerning 
certain armed conflicts can be consigned to this category and that exclusion in 
advance of such disputes from the Court’s jurisdiction will meet with a kind of 
tacit agreement of all States affected by the given armed conflict. 
 In illustration of the later “advantage” or “disadvantage” of a reservation by 
a party to the optional clause system to the other States party to the system we 
could cite various examples, but in reality the question of when a reservation 
in the declaration of a State will become of disadvantage or of advantage to 
another State party the optional clause system is subject to change from case to 
case. The latter is the case whenever the respondent State in its preliminary 
objection invokes the reservation in the declaration of acceptance by the 
applicant State and the objection is uphelded by the Court. The best known 
among such cases is the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, in which Norway 
as the respondent referred to, on the basis of reciprocity, the very controversial 
Connally reservation included in the French declaration of acceptance. The 
Court uphold the Norwegian objection and held that it had no jurisdiction.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 40 See the Court’s judgement on the preliminary objections: Case of Certain Norwegian 
Loans Judgement of 6 July 1957. ICJ Reports 1957. 9–28. 
